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I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s society, crime has become exceptionally prevalent and uncontrollable
at times. Recent political campaigns have been filled with promises to continue the
war on crime. However, this reality does not permit law enforcement officials to use
any means necessary to catch criminals. Some limitations are needed to control the
government’s actions. The outrageous government conduct defense is one such
limitation that the courts have developed. It is possible that some government
conduct may be found to have violated the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.1 If the government engages in conduct that is declared to be

1
No person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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outrageous and “shocking to the conscience,”2 dismissal of the indictment may be
appropriate. One problem is that some nontraditional methods of investigating crime
currently in use have not been declared outrageous enough to warrant use of the
defense; as a result, law enforcement officials have gotten away with some extremely
reprehensible conduct.
This Note analyzes law enforcement’s use of one particularly troublesome
tactic—the use of sexual acts or romantic promises to encourage a defendant to
participate in illegal activities or to obtain information that can be used against the
defendant at trial.3 The use of sex as an investigative tactic should constitute one
type of outrageous government conduct. Perhaps more than any other tactic used in
the law enforcement arena, the use of sex to persuade individuals to commit criminal
acts violates our society’s beliefs about the powers of the police and the importance
of sexual intimacy in citizens’ lives. These types of intimate acts have serious moral
implications and fall extremely short of the acceptable standards of police
investigative conduct.4 The use of sex as an investigative tool leads to a violation of
the right to privacy and exploits intimate relations and trust. The public cannot
tolerate the exploitation of such relations without lessening their own respect for
their contact with others. There must be a limit as to what the undercover
agents/informants can usually do to deceive a defendant,5 especially with respect to
sexual liaisons.
The first part of this Note gives a brief history of the outrageous government
conduct defense, including its distinction from entrapment, its origin and its lack of
success in the courts. Although the entrapment defense and the outrageous conduct
defense have some similarities, they are in fact quite different. The second section of
this Note discusses the perception of sex and intimacy in the United States, and why
according to this perception and the Constitution, the use of sex/intimacy is not an
appropriate investigative tool. Section three of this Note examines police ethics and
demonstrates that they do not and should not include using sex or intimacy during
investigations. Part four analyzes federal and state sexual misconduct cases, and
explains why the decisions reached by the courts are incorrect and immoral

2

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that forcible entry into
defendant’s room by law enforcement officials, and then transportation to a hospital to have
morphine capsules removed from his stomach, was conduct that “shocks the conscience”).
3

Barry Tarlow, Column, RICO Report: Fertile Ground for Entrapment Defense, 23
CHAMPION 38 (1999). Barry Tarlow is a nationally prominent criminal defense lawyer
practicing in Los Angeles, California. He is a frequent author and lecturer on criminal law.
Tarlow’s column discusses how sexual misconduct by undercover agents and informants is
becoming more frequent, though not being recognized as outrageous enough to warrant
dismissal of an indictment.
4

Id. at 39.

5

Richard Lawrence Daniels, Note and Comment, United States v. Simpson:
‘Outrageousness!’ What Does it Really Mean?--An Examination of the Outrageous Conduct
Defense, 18 SW. U. L. REV. 105, 119 (1988). This note and comment discusses the origin of
the outrageous conduct defense and how it is different than entrapment. Daniels also
examines United States v. Simpson and how the use of sexual misconduct by a government
informer should have been declared as outrageous by using the totality of circumstances
approach.
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according to the Constitution and the views of sex and intimacy expressed in the
United States.
Finally, this Note concludes that the use of sexual or emotional intimacy by
undercover agents/informants as an investigative tool is unconstitutional, outrageous
and should be forbidden. There is no possible way to draw a line or develop a proper
standard to apply when undercover agents use sexual conduct. This type of conduct
is outrageous across the board and will lead to a lack of trust in law enforcement by
all people in society. The solution is that this conduct should be prohibited
altogether.
II. HISTORY OF THE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE
A. Distinguishing Entrapment from Outrageous Government Conduct
The courts developed the outrageous government conduct defense to protect the
due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.6 Due process of law has been
summarized as “a constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities
which … are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental, … or are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”7 If the conduct
of law enforcement officers and informants rises to a proscribed level of
outrageousness, these due process principles will bar the government/prosecution
from using the judicial system,8 and hence, the indictment will be dismissed. To
protect the values that exist in the Constitution, the courts have developed the due
process defense “to limit government conduct that brutalizes, abuses, or harasses,
invades privacy, or in other ways unreasonably intrudes into people’s lives.”9 In
order to raise a due process claim, the government activity must violate some
protected right of the defendant,10 violate the sense of “fundamental fairness” found
in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and “shock the universal sense of
justice.”11 Dismissal based on outrageous conduct is reserved for only the most
egregious circumstances, and “…is not to be invoked each time the government acts

6

Catherine Baker Stetson, Outrageous Conduct: A Fifth Amendment Due Process
Defense, 5 CRIM. JUST. J. 55, 67 (1981). This comment discusses the existence of the
outrageous conduct defense and how it has been established and viewed by the courts. Stetson
also argues that there is a distinction between outrageous conduct and entrapment, and that the
courts should be careful not to confuse them. See also supra note 1.
7

Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.

8

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (first recognized the possibility of
a defense based on due process).
9
Bennett L. Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66
MINN. L. REV. 567, 597 (1982). The author argues that courts who do recognize the
outrageous conduct defense declare rulings which fail to guide subsequent courts, thus causing
the defense to be unpredictable and inadequate.
10

Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion upholds
recognition of the due process defense).
11

Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.
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deceptively.”12 The defense requires more than a mere demonstration of flagrant
police conduct.13 Additionally, whether the government’s conduct is sufficiently
outrageous to violate due process is a question of law and unlike the entrapment
defense, is not an issue for the jury.14
Entrapment, a judicially created affirmative defense, is not based on any
constitutional right.15 Entrapment occurs whenever the police plan, suggest, instigate
or aid in the commission of a crime that would not have otherwise occurred.16 Even
though the defendant committed the crime, the entrapment defense states that he/she
should not be punished if the crime was instigated by the government.17 The
entrapment defense consists of two elements: (1) the use of persuasion, trickery, or
fraud by law enforcement officers or their agents to induce a defendant to commit a
crime;18 and (2) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government
rather than that of the innocent defendant.19 The entrapment defense and the
outrageous conduct defense are frequently raised together; however, they are
distinctly different.20
The important question asked in entrapment cases is whether the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime before any government instigation.21 If the
defendant is found to have been predisposed to commit the crime, and if the idea
originated with the defendant, then no entrapment exists even if the government was
involved in the commission of the offense.22 By contrast, the key inquiry that must

12

United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1577 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.
Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992)).
13

State v. Myers, 689 P.2d 38, 41 (1984).

14

See United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2nd Cir. 1980) (arguing that it is for
the trial court and not the jury to decide whether outrageous government conduct has
occurred); See also United States v. Sotelo-Murillo, 887 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989) (arguing
that a prosecution barred on due process grounds is a legal question to be determined by the
court, not the jury).
15

Stetson, supra note 6, at 55.

16

B. Grant Stitt & Gene G. James, Entrapment: An Ethical Analysis, in MORAL ISSUES IN
POLICE WORK 129, 130 (1985).
17

Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law
Enforcement Justification, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 745, 748 (1992). Greaney discusses the
existence of the due process defense and how the predisposition of the defendant is irrelevant.
She then argues that law enforcement officials should be subject to the same laws as normal
citizens, and that the means used must justify the ends.
18

See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1958).

19

Id.

20

Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: The Journey Back, 27
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1990). The author argues that the lines between the objective test
of entrapment and the due process defense are hazy, and that the due process defense is only
reserved for the most intolerable government conduct.
21

Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932).

22

Id. at 451.
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be made in an outrageous conduct defense is whether the government’s conduct was
outrageous and violated some due process right of the defendant.23 Therefore,
according to the outrageous conduct defense, even if the defendant was predisposed
to commit the crime, the indictment should be dismissed if the government conduct
is found to be outrageous. This inquiry focuses on an objective approach to the
government’s conduct; whereas the entrapment inquiry focuses on a subjective
approach or the predisposition of the defendant.24 A few state courts have criticized
the generally accepted “subjective” test of entrapment and have adopted instead an
“objective” test in which the court considers only the nature of the police conduct
involved, without reference to the predisposition of the particular defendant.25
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish between the
subjective approach (predisposition) and the objective approach (government
conduct) of entrapment.26 Hence, the subjective approach was the traditional
entrapment approach, and the objective approach of entrapment was basically
identical to the new outrageous conduct defense.27 Because objective entrapment
and the outrageous conduct defense are so similar, under an objective entrapment
theory, even a predisposed defendant cannot be convicted if the government’s
conduct amounts to a violation of due process. However, when defendants use this
defense, it usually falls under the outrageous government conduct name and not
objective entrapment.
In 1932, the first case to recognize the entrapment defense, Sorrells v. United
States, involved a defendant charged with violating the National Prohibition Act.28
A prohibition agent requested liquor from the defendant three times, appealing to
their common experiences in World War I, before the defendant acquiesced and
obtained the alcohol for the agent.29 The Court began its analysis of the possible
entrapment defense by stating: “It is well settled that the fact that officers or
employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem
may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.”30 Nonetheless, the
entrapment defense should be granted if the criminal design originates with the
government and induces an otherwise innocent person into committing a crime
purely to obtain a conviction.31 The Court recognized the defense of entrapment and
23

See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.

24

Marcus, supra note 20, at 458; see also Molly K. Nichols, Note, Entrapment and Due
Process: How Far Is Too Far?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1984) (discussing the
similarities between objective entrapment and the due process defense).
25
See, e.g., People v. Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 1990) (noting that it has been
suggested that the “outrageous government conduct” defense is merely the objective theory of
entrapment under a different name).
26

United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 349 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981).

27

Stetson, supra note 6, at 63; see also Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d at 890-91.

28

287 U.S. 435 (1932).

29

Id. at 439.

30

Id. at 441.

31

Id. at 442.
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reversed the conviction, explaining that the controlling question in entrapment cases
is “whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is
seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity
of its own officials.”32 The Court seems to have defined entrapment primarily in
terms of the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime (the subjective
standard), rather than focusing on the actual conduct of the government (the
objective standard). Nevertheless, the language above does not actually address
what role the government’s actions should play in deciding whether or not the
defense of entrapment will be applicable.33 Moreover, the concurring opinion argued
that entrapment should focus on the government’s conduct and not on the
predisposition of the defendant.34
Sherman v. United States, a case decided twenty-six years later, addressed the
conflict between the subjective and objective standards of entrapment.35 In this case,
a government informant met the defendant during rehabilitation treatments and asked
the defendant if he could supply him with narcotics.36 The defendant refused several
times, but eventually supplied the informant with the narcotics primarily because of
the informant’s description of the suffering he was enduring due to his withdrawal.37
The defendant was arrested on narcotics charges and successfully raised the defense
of entrapment.38 The Court reasoned that the mere affording of opportunities to
commit an offense is not entrapment, but that “Congress could not have intended that
its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.”39 The
conviction was reversed on the basis that the defendant was not predisposed to
commit the crime;40 nevertheless, the concurring opinion once again argued that the
focus of the entrapment defense should be on the conduct of the government and not
on the defendant.41 Because of this tension between subjective and objective views
32

Id. at 451.

33

Greaney, supra note 17, at 757.

34

Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring) (The applicable principle is that courts
must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government’s own agents. No other
issue, no comparison of equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has
any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy).
35

356 U.S. 369 (1958).

36

Id. at 371.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 370.

39

Id. at 372.

40

Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373-78.

41

The Sherman concurrence stated:
“The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct itself is
whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to
which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power. For
answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the ‘intention’ to commit the crime originated
with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal conduct was the product
of the ‘creative activity’ of law-enforcement officials.”
Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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of the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court would later address more cases
concerning entrapment and what standard should be used.
B. Origin of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense
The classic case first addressing due process concerns about the conduct of law
enforcement officials was Rochin v. California in 1952.42 In Rochin, three deputy
sheriffs forced their way into Rochin’s room and found him sitting on the side of the
bed.43 The officers asked him about the morphine pills on his nightstand, but instead
of responding Rochin swallowed the capsules.44 After a struggle, the officers took
Rochin to a hospital and directed a doctor to pump his stomach to obtain the
swallowed capsules; the pills were used as the principle evidence to convict him.45
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on due process grounds, rather than on
an analysis of illegal search and seizure.46 The Court stated: “It would be a
stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast
upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by
force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.”47 The Court
concluded that the way this conviction was obtained did “… more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.”48 This language of the
Court provided the basis for which the due process defense would be recognized and
defined in the future.
Some years later, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Russell on
entrapment grounds.49 However, this case first recognized and laid the groundwork
for the future of the outrageous government conduct defense.50 In Russell, an
undercover government agent assigned to locate a suspected methamphetamine lab
approached Russell by offering to supply an essential and rare chemical used in the
production of the drug.51 Russell was convicted after asserting an entrapment
defense and argued on appeal that even though a jury could have found him
predisposed to commit the crime, entrapment existed as a matter of law.52 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the grounds that a government

42

342 U.S. 165 (1952).

43

Id. at 166.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 174. “This Court granted certiorari because a serious question is raised as to the
limitations which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the
conduct of criminal proceedings by the states.” Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168.
47

Id. at 173.

48

Id. at 172.

49

411 U.S. 423 (1973).

50

Id. at 431-32.

51

Id. at 425.

52

Id. at 427.
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agent supplied an essential ingredient to the manufacturing of the drug.53
Additionally, the court held that a defense to a criminal charge exists if the
government’s participation in a criminal offense is excessive.54
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the defendant
could have obtained the ingredient from another source and had done so before the
government became involved.55 The Court decided the case on entrapment grounds
and found that the defense was inapplicable because the defendant had been
predisposed to commit the crime, and the government had not induced him to
become involved.56 However, the Court did recognize the possible existence of the
outrageous government conduct defense in dicta by stating that “We may some day
be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.”57 Even though the focus of this
case concentrated on the subjective approach to entrapment (predisposition of the
defendant), the dissent noted that there existed both a subjective and objective
approach to entrapment.58 Furthermore, the dissent argued that because of the
inadequacies of the subjective approach, the due process defense was needed.59
Due to the persistence of this split in analysis between the subjective and
objective theories of entrapment, the Supreme Court addressed the issue again in
Hampton v. United States.60 In this case, a government informant supplied drugs to
the defendant who then sold the drugs to government agents.61 The jury rejected the
defendant’s assertion that he did not know the substance was heroin and found him
guilty of distribution.62 The defendant’s alternative defense of entrapment eventually
reached the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Court was unable to reach a majority
opinion, and a three-member plurality of the Court found that predisposition renders
both the entrapment defense and due process defense unavailable under Russell.63
The two concurring members found that Russell did not preclude a due process
defense when defendants were predisposed, but that Hampton did not require
reversal based on this conclusion because the government’s conduct here was not
overreaching.64 While the dissent agreed with the concurrence that a due process
defense should be available to defendants based upon outrageous government
53

Id.

54

Russell, 411 U.S. at 431.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 433.

57

Id. at 431-32.

58

Id. at 440-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

59

Russell, 411 U.S. at 440-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

60

425 U.S. 484 (1976).

61

Id. at 485.

62

Id. at 487.

63

Id. at 488-90 (opinion of Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., & White, J.).

64

Id. at 492-95 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
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conduct, they disagreed with both the plurality and the concurrence that entrapment
should be defined in terms of predisposition instead of the nature of the
government’s conduct.65 In summation, a total of five members of the Court held
that a defense based on the due process clause, though not relevant here, had not
been overruled by the Court’s holding in Russell and still permitted predisposed
defendants to take advantage of the defense.66 Although this decision seemed like a
positive one for defendants, the courts continued to look harshly on the use of the
defense.
C. The Lack of Success of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense
The status of the law has remained the same.67 Most courts continue to reject a
defense of outrageous government conduct. The Supreme Court has left the door
open for the defense of outrageous government conduct; however, it has never been
presented with facts that support it.68 Most lower federal courts and state courts
recognize the defense.69 Nonetheless, one circuit has chosen to reject any possibility
of the defense.70 The defense is raised frequently, yet rarely successfully.71 One of
the main reasons for the lack of success of this defense is that the Supreme Court has
never provided any concrete guidelines on which to define outrageous government
conduct.72 Concepts such as “fundamental fairness” and “universal sense of justice”
are difficult to measure; thus, “[n]o federal court has defined with any sort of
precision the contours of the outrageous conduct defense.”73 Although Justice
Frankfurter proceeded to suggest in Sherman v. United States74 that appeals to
“sympathy, friendship and the possibility of exorbitant gain” cannot be tolerated,75 he
65

Hampton, 425 U.S. at 496-47 (Brennan, Stewart, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).

66

Dana M. Todd, Note, In Defense of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense in the
Federal Courts, 84 KY. L.J. 415, 430 (1995/1996) [hereinafter Todd] (discussing the origin of
the outrageous conduct defense, how the different courts have viewed the defense, and certain
types of conduct that defendants argue should warrant dismissal of their indictment, but are
unsuccessful in the courts) (citing PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 277-78 (1989).
67

Todd, supra note 66, at 430.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defense could not
prevail for three reasons: Hampton effectively overruled the dictum in Russell; the court
lacked the authority to exercise its supervisory powers where no independent constitutional
right was violated; and there were constitutional separation of powers concerns).
71

Todd, supra note 66, at 430 (Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What Conduct of Federal Law
Enforcement Authorities in Inducing or Co-operating in Criminal Offense Raises Due Process
Defense Distinct from Entrapment, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 273, 285 (1990)). Id.
72
United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nom, United
States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (outrageous conduct cannot be defined by
set standards).
73

Id.

74

356 U.S. 369 (1958).

75

Id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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concluded that “[w]hat police conduct is to be condemned … must be picked out
from case to case as new situations arise involving different crimes and new methods
of detection.”76 Instead of defining outrageous conduct and then analyzing the facts
of the cases according to the definition, “the courts characteristically recite a litany
of facts and then cast their votes against the defendant.”77 This method lacks any
type of analytical structure, and it is influenced by social and political pressures that
are continuously changing because of the “inherent flux in socio-political norms.”78
The lack of applicable judicial standards has caused the defense to rarely be
successful as lower courts have no guidance to follow in making their decisions. As
a result, a plethora of lower court decisions have been produced that lack any type of
sound judicial analysis whatsoever.
Because the Supreme Court has never approved a defense based on due process
violations resulting from outrageous government conduct, the lower federal courts
have been extremely sparing in their approval of the defense.79 The defense has been
raised in a multitude of offenses involving drugs;80 bribery;81 mail and wire fraud;82
escape from prison;83 bootlegging;84 child pornography;85 credit card fraud;86
counterfeiting;87 sale, possession, transportation, or exportation of explosives or
firearms;88 food stamp fraud;89 theft, burglary and conversion;90 fish and game
violations;91 extortion;92 criminal contempt;93 illegal transportation of aliens;94 and
76

Id. at 384.

77

Greaney, supra note 17, at 773.

78

Id.

79

Todd, supra note 66, at 432.

80

See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).

81

See, e.g., United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321 (2d Cir. 1984).

82

See, e.g., United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).

83

See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1986).

84

See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).

85

See, e.g., United States v. Boffardi, 684 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

86

See, e.g., United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091 (2d Cir. 1985).

87

See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 540 F.2d 1152 (1st Cir. 1976).

88

See, e.g., United States v. Caron, 615 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1980).

89

See, e.g., United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1982).

90

See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980).

91

See, e.g., United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986).

92

See, e.g., United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1984).

93
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 602 F. Supp.
1052 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 780 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Young
v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
94
See, e.g., United States v. Valdóvinos, 588 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Cal.), rev’d on other
grounds, 743 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1984).
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arson.95 However, only two circuits have reversed convictions based on the
outrageous government conduct defense. The Ninth Circuit in Greene v. United
States96 addressed the issue of outrageous government conduct as a defense and
found it to be successful. In Greene, a government agent pressured the defendants
into re-establishing their bootlegging operation.97 The agent was involved in the
operation for over a two-year period and was the defendants’ only customer in their
operation.98 The defendants were convicted of conspiracy, possession of an unlawful
still, and unlawful sale of distilled spirits.99 The Court looked at the totality of the
circumstances and decided that the government’s conduct had reached a level of
outrageousness that warranted reversal of the conviction.100 The court reasoned that
although this case was not the typical entrapment case, “the same underlying
objections which render entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice are
operative.”101 Additionally, the court stated that the conduct of the government rose
to a level of “creative activity” that was more intense and aggressive than the activity
found against the government in numerous entrapment cases that it had examined.102
The Third Circuit in United States v. Twigg103 also addressed the due process
issue. In Twigg, a government informant contacted one of the defendants to set up
an illegal drug laboratory for which he provided the equipment, materials and site
needed to manufacture speed.104 The informant also proceeded to produce the drug
with minimal assistance from the defendants.105 The court analyzed the permissible
range of government conduct by noting that while infiltration of criminal operations
via undercover agents and informants is acceptable, the tactics used in this case were
not.106 The court stated that “[u]nlike other cases rejecting this defense, the police
investigation here was not concerned with an existing laboratory; the illicit plan did
not originate with the criminal defendants; and neither of the defendants were
chemists, an indispensable requisite to this criminal enterprise.”107 The court
concluded that the governmental involvement in the criminal activities of this case

95

See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983).

96

454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).

97

Id. at 787.

98

Id. at 785, 786.

99

Id. at 783.

100

Id. at 787.

101

Greene, 454 F.2d at 787.

102

Id.

103

588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978).

104

Id. at 375-76.

105

Id. Twigg’s actions were at the specific direction of the government’s informant, and
“Twigg contributed nothing in terms of expertise, money, supplies, or ideas.” Id. at 382.
106

Id. at 380.

107

Twigg, 588 F.2d at 381 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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had reached “… a demonstrable level of outrageousness and mandated reversal of
the conviction.”108
Other than Twigg and Greene, very few cases exist in which the outrageous
government conduct claim has prevailed.109 Some courts have attempted to develop
factors or compile lists of what type of government conduct has been proven
acceptable.110 Examples of acceptable behavior that have been listed include: using
“artifice and stratagem” to combat crime;111 using paid informants;112 supplying
contraband to defendants to gain their confidence;113 providing necessary and
valuable items to help further a conspiracy already in existence;114 infiltrating a
criminal organization;115 and approaching those already engaged in or contemplating
criminal actions.116 The listing of unacceptable behavior, however, proved to be
more difficult. The court in United States v. Bogart defined these activities as the
use of “unwarranted physical, or perhaps mental, coercion.”117 But then the question
of what actually constitutes physical and mental coercion must be asked. Drawing
lines between acceptable and unacceptable police conduct may seem helpful,
although ultimately every case must be decided on its own facts.118 Additionally,
“haziness surrounding the type of conduct that will not be tolerated leaves the due
process defense open to the possibility that its parameters will be determined by the
fears and concerns of society at the time the defense is raised, rather than by the

108

Id.

109
See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1975) (holding a “full circle”
narcotics sting intolerable and reversing the defendant’s conviction, but failing to label the
rationale as one based on due process); United States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (dismissing an indictment on due process grounds where an undercover agent persuaded
a non-predisposed, fellow postal worker to obtain cocaine by using their friendship and
repeatedly asking for the favor); United States v. Valdóvinos, 588 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (holding INS service recruiting Mexican nationals in Mexico to enter U.S. illegally
outrageous); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (dismissing
the indictment because of government over-involvement in drug operation); People v.
Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978) (holding police overreaching outrageous).
110
See, e.g., United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (where defendant
claimed that a government informant had coaxed him to accept narcotics as payment for
posters, the court remanded the case back for findings of fact on the nature of and motivation
for the government’s conduct).
111

Id. at 1438 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)).

112

Id. (referencing United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1378 (9th Cir. 1980)).

113

Id. (referencing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)).

114

Id. (referencing United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1983)).

115

Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438 (referencing United States v. Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354, 1357
(9th Cir. 1984)).
116

Id. (referencing United States v. O’Connor, 737 F.2d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1984)).

117

Id.

118

Id.
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boundaries of the Constitution.”119
This lack of a concrete standard has
compromised the viability of the defense because courts have no guidance or specific
standards to look to when deciding cases that involve overreaching government
conduct. Moreover, a concrete standard is needed to show that the use of sexual acts
and romantic intimacy by the government as a type of investigative tool is
unacceptable and outside the boundaries of the Constitution because it violates
fundamental due process and privacy rights of the defendant. Additionally, it
involves government acts that fall short of the acceptable standards of police
investigative conduct.
III. THE CULTURE/NORMS OF SEX AND INTIMACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Sexual misconduct/romantic intimacy is an investigative method that law
enforcement officials have recently been using that contains serious moral and
constitutional implications. This type of conduct rarely meets the stringent
requirements needed for dismissal based upon outrageous governmental conduct,120
although defendants make a strong case that “… legitimate undercover operations
can be conducted without federal agents acting like modern day Mata Haris.”121
Before exploring the federal and state cases dealing with sexual misconduct, it is
wise to examine how the United States views sex and intimacy. According to
popular, public views, sex and intimacy should not be used by law enforcement
officials in investigating crime today. Police ethics do not condone these relatively
new methods for combating crime, which may lead to negative results in society.
A. Sex, Intimacy, and Morality
Human beings are sexual beings, with sex being one of the motivating forces in
their lives.122 “Sexual experience is for human beings, … a profoundly personal,
spontaneous, and absorbing experience in which they express intimate fantasies and
vulnerabilities which typically cannot brook the sense of an external, critical
observer.”123 Humans use sexuality for many different purposes―to express
intimacy or love, for recreation or for procreation.124 No one purpose constantly
dominates. Instead, human self-control chooses among the purposes depending on
the context of the situation and the type of person involved.125 Intimacy is a major
119

Greaney, supra note 17, at 778-79.

120

Tarlow, supra note 3, at 38.

121

United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 1991). Mata Hari was the stage
name adopted by Margaretha Zell, a dark and beautiful Dutch woman born in 1876. She
became an exotic dancer and then a World War I spy for the Germans. Her spying began
through a series of wealthy lovers. Experience the Internet’s Most Powerful Search Agent:
Name and Logo, Who was Mata Hari?, at http://www.thewebtools.com/aboot/namelogo.htm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2001).
122
LEONARD V. RAMER, YOUR SEXUAL BILL
EFFECTS OF SEXUAL PROHIBITIONS 13 (1973).

OF

RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS

OF THE

HARMFUL

123

THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 75-76 (1983).

124

Id. at 76.

125

Id.
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part of sex and relationships between human beings. Intimacy often “… involves
bringing another person within one’s soul or being, not for any independently
personal or instrumental objective, but for the sake of the other person or for the sake
of the bond and attachment between the persons.”126 No other kind of relationship
touches so centrally the core of one’s being, and nothing else constitutes such an
important resource for dealing with the problems of the world.127
“Vulnerability” and “unenforceable trust” exist in intimate relationships and is
not evident in other types of social or business relationships.128 One court has
remarked that “[i]t should be common knowledge that sex involves physical and
psychological desires so strong as to readily foster fantasies and to anesthetize or
supplant normal rational reasoning and will.”129 Exploitation of this physical desire
and trust is both harmful and degrading to the person involved, as well as to all
persons who have respect for intimate relationships.130 Additionally, “like our
ancestors in the Garden of Eden, no one is completely impervious to seductive
temptations.”131 It certainly may be true that not every person in society has his/her
price or can be tempted. Yet certain investigative conduct (mostly sexual) does
prove able to produce offenses a good portion of the time.132 This type of conduct is
“deeply subversive of the possibility of friendship, love, and trust,”133 and its use in
law enforcement is “morally equivalent to the decision to use violence; indeed it is a
kind of torture.”134
“Intimate relationships involve potential transformations of moral duties.”135 In
morals, as in daily life, knowing certain features of a situation is pertinent to one’s
act being regarded as voluntary.136 Having control over what certain persons know
126

Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Police Undercover Work, in MORAL ISSUES IN
POLICE WORK 147, 156 (Frederick A. Elliston & Michael Feldberg eds., Rowman & Allenheld
1985).
127

Id.

128

Id.

129

State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *3 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. Aug. 28, 1986) (where government informer used kissing and romantic teasing to
convince defendant to buy drugs).
130

Schoeman, supra note 126, at 156.

131

Bennett L. Gershman, Toward a Common Law for Undercover Investigations―a Book
Review of ABSCAM Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement, 52 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 166, 168 (1983).
132

Gary T. Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised By The New Police
Undercover Work, in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
65, 74 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., The Police Foundation 1983).
133
Sanford Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, in ABSCAM ETHICS:
MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 43, 50 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., The
Police Foundation 1983).
134

Id. at 50-51.

135

Schoeman, supra note 126, at 156.

136

Id.
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or learn about us is vital to our lives and the relationships we form.137 Similarly, a
person has an interest in “… knowing all relevant characteristics of those with whom
he forms any personal relationships and of those to whom he discloses information
concerning relationships with others.”138 People need to assume a level of good faith
as being present in the relationship or encounter.139 Additionally, people are entitled
to the belief that those who present themselves will not be wishing harm or using the
situation as a means of furthering their “malevolence.”140 Although “American law
is generally unconcerned with protecting intimate relationships, it does recognize the
existence of legal privileges that seek to protect the intimacy of certain relationships
by barring autonomous choices to betray specific confidences.”141 To the extent that
people are unable to trust normal appearances, “social disorder is created,” and
morality is disturbed.142
The term “moral” has been interpreted broadly. Morality has been associated
with such things as sexual conduct, honesty, truthfulness and religion.143 Morality
has always implied a higher and nobler level of behavior.144 In addition, many
diverse types of behavior have been evaluated according to moral standards.145
Litigating morality is not a recent occurrence. “Americans have inherited from the
English legal culture an extensive record of litigation of moral issues.”146 “The legal
process that has documented this litigation includes numerous elements that have
individually and collectively influenced the course of moral disputes.”147 The right
to privacy goes hand in hand with the concept of litigating morality. Privacy
becomes essential for sexual conduct and other intimate relations. By examining the
roots of the constitutional right to privacy and how morality relates to this right, it
becomes evident that abuse of these privacy rights through sexual investigative tools
used by law enforcement officials disturbs morality and violates these rights.

137

Id.

138

Levinson, supra note 133, at 57.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 57-58.

141

Gershman, supra note 131, at 173.

142

Id.

143

WAYNE C. BARTEE & ALICE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, LITIGATING MORALITY: AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT AND ITS ENGLISH ROOTS xi (1992).
144

Id.

145

Id

146
Id. at xi-xii. Litigation of moral issues includes abortion, marriage, sodomy,
pornography, and contraception. Id.
147

BARTEE & BARTEE, supra note 143, at xi-xii. Among these elements are written laws
(statutory and constitutional) which have recorded past moral choices; judges and juries who
apply and interpret the laws and precedents; and the legal scholars and attorneys who have the
job of explaining and defending moral choices. Id.
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B. Constitutional Implications
The constitutional right to privacy was developed in Griswold v. Connecticut.148
The Court based its conclusion of a right to privacy on a number of constitutional
provisions that could be violated by governmental intrusion into people’s lives.149
The most common of these constitutional provisions are the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Fourth Amendment Search and
Seizure Clause.150 The most dramatic extension of the constitutional right to privacy
came in 1973 when the Court struck down a number of restrictive abortion laws in
several states.151 These privacy rights used in the abortion cases are often viewed as
or reduced to liberty rights.152 Even if this view is not accepted, a strong connection
or bond exists between the two sets of rights.153 It is the norm or standard of
individuality and personal autonomy that provides the reason for liberty, the
recognition of a domain of self-regarding conduct, and a sphere of privacy of
personal information and knowledge that should remain within a person’s control.154
Additionally, the gaining of this knowledge by unauthorized persons is usually
considered a serious breach.155
The demand for privacy is founded on the need for moral space, that is “… for
conditions under which we can be, and can feel ourselves to be, acting authentically
and independently.”156 Moral space is needed for the development and maintenance
of individuality, and liberty is one condition for ensuring moral space.157 However,
not all relationships exhibit moral space. If no relationship of mutual intimacy
exists, moral space can be secured only if privacy is respected.158 Business
relationships, for example, do not commonly exhibit moral space; therefore, privacy
needs to be respected in order for a person to feel as if he/she is acting
independently.

148

381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that prohibited to
married couples as to others the use of contraceptives).
149

GREY, supra note 123, at 7.

150

See supra note 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (No state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …”); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
151

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

152

JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 190 (1996).

153

Id.

154

Id. at 191. Information such as one’s sex life, medical history, and financial status is
usually considered private. Id.
155

Id. at 191.

156

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 192.

157

Id. at 192.

158

Id. That is, only if one is permitted to have control over one’s self-preservation. Id.
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Due process becomes intertwined with privacy and liberty rights. Every citizen
must be afforded due process of law, that is, “… a discrete concept which subsists as
an independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness …”159 Due process has
not been reduced to any formula; it represents the balance which our country has
struck between respect for the liberty of individuals and the demands of organized
society.160 This liberty is a “rational continuum” which includes freedom from
arbitrary and purposeless restraints, and which recognizes that a reasonable judgment
requires careful scrutiny of state and individual needs.161 Deprivations of liberty are
textually illegal unless accompanied by due process of law.162 Privacy and liberty
rights seem to involve a trend of the government respecting people’s private lives.
The problem becomes the distinction between what is public and what is private.
When law enforcement officials use investigative methods that amount to
deprivations of liberty and privacy rights, the government has stepped out of the
public sphere and into the private one. The Constitution has been violated when the
government engages in sexual conduct that is reserved for only the private sphere
and hence, these methods should be forbidden. The exploitation of trust and intimate
relations is harmful and degrading to not only the person involved, but also to all
persons who have respect for intimate and personal relationships. By examining the
history and boundaries of police ethics and behavior, it should be relatively easy to
conclude that the use of sexual conduct and romantic intimacy by law enforcement
officials is unjustifiable and unconstitutional.
IV. POLICE ETHICS/MORALS DURING INVESTIGATIONS
Society’s treatment of those people who fail to conform to its chosen standards of
behavior has raised moral questions. These moral questions are not just concerned
with rules and principles, but also with virtues, character, reasons and attitudes.163
The due process clause “… is a dominant constitutional force to protect the moral
values related to undercover police work, particularly the freedom and integrity of
the individual’s will from governmental intrusion and deception.”164 Police activity
must be regulated by more than the law--it must respect the most deeply held moral
values of the community.165 Laws can be amended quickly; however, “public

159
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (earlier Connecticut
birth control case).
160

Id.

161

Id. at 543.

162

Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process
Test Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 261,
278 (1993) (arguing that police tactics need to be regulated, and the use of reasonable
suspicion as a safeguard for all invasions of liberty is the solution).
163

KLEINIG, supra note 152 at 7.

164

Gershman, supra note 131, at 184. “As such, the due process clause mirrors the
equitable principle that courts will not tolerate governmental oppression, particularly
oppression that seeks to undermine an individual’s free will.” Id.
165

Schoeman, supra note 126, at 158.
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notions of respect for persons and their privacy is less subject to fluctuations.”166
Government cannot ignore what is so important to human beings. People need to be
involved in trusting and intimate relationships and when respect for these types of
relationships is abandoned, the worth of the social order is severely diminished.167
The use of sex as an investigative tool violates this trust and preys on the respect that
people have for intimate relationships. Without the trust and privacy needed in
intimate affairs, social order is disturbed and people begin to think and act
differently. Codes of ethics have been developed to combat the abuse of government
power.
A. Codes of Ethics
Professionals are usually governed by a “code of ethics.” Law enforcement
officials are no different. A professional code is a sign of an occupation’s true
professionalization.168 The code comprises a public set of constraints under which
the members promise to operate, and it is intended to provide “a tangible basis for
public trust.”169 These codes are for the benefit of the public, as well as the
professional. They act not only as a guarantee to those who use professional services
that certain standards will be observed, but when violated, they may jeopardize the
standing of certain recognized members of a particular profession.170
Police organizations have always promulgated codes of ethics. The first code for
United States police was developed in 1928.171 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
published its FBI Pledge for Law Enforcement Officers in 1937.172 Then in 1956, a
code of ethics prepared by the Police Officer’s Research Association of California
was adopted by the National Conference of Police Associations, and in 1957 it was
adopted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.173 This Law
Enforcement Code of Ethics (with changes made to it in 1991) is still used today.174
166

Id.

167

Id.

168

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 33.

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Id. at 235. The history of the 1928 code is interesting. On the recommendation of an
architect of the professionalization movement in American policing, August Vollmer, a young
protégé, O. W. Wilson, was appointed as Chief of the Wichita Police Department. This young
protégé put into practice what he had learned from his mentor and wrote a code that assured
the citizens that the police department was now there for them. Additionally, he rewrote the
department’s manual stressing strict lines of authority, clear and efficient procedures, and rigid
standards of conduct. Id.
172

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 235. Printed in the December 1937 issue of the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, the director introduced the Pledge as being for the “voluntary
consideration, acceptance, execution and adherence by all law enforcement officers.” Id.
Police departments would get their employees to sign and forward the pledges to the FBI,
which then used the Bulletin to update the readers about its adoption throughout the United
States. Id.
173

Id. at 235.

174

Id. at 236.
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Law enforcement officers promise to serve mankind; guard the lives and property of
all people; protect the innocent against deception and the weak against oppression;
respect the Constitutional rights of all people; keep private and public life separate;
etc.175 A code of ethics should set standards beyond ordinary morality if it is to
operate as an effective code of ethics.176 Similarly, something more must be
demanded of those to whom the code of ethics applies; yet, if a code is to be realized
in practice, it cannot ask more than most of those people subject to it are willing to
give.177 However, it has been argued that police ethics may be the exception―that
police are only subject to the ethical and moral standards of normal people.178 The
reason for this discrepancy may be due to the kind of work in which police are
engaged. Likewise, “[b]ecause some police work seems to be inherently corrupting,
police departments need to be more careful than they are about the work they do.”179
175

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 236. The complete Law Enforcement Code of Ethics,
including the 1991 changes to the italicized parts noted in brackets, is as follows:
As a Law Enforcement Officer, my fundamental duty is to serve mankind [the
community]; to safeguard the lives and property; to protect the innocent against
deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against
violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional rights of all men [ ] to liberty,
equality and justice.
I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all; [, and will behave in a
manner that does not bring discredit to me or my agency. I will] maintain courageous
calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly
mindful of the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed, in both my personal and
official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the laws of the land [ ] and the regulations
of my department. Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided
to me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless revelation is necessary in
the performance of my duty.
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, [political beliefs, or
aspirations,] animosities or friendships to influence my decisions. With no
compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the
law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never
employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities.
I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and I accept it as a
public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of the law enforcement [police]
service. [I will never engage in acts of corruption or bribery, nor will I condone such
acts by other police officers. I will cooperate with all legally recognized agencies and
their representatives in the pursuit of justice.
I know that I alone am responsible for my own standard of professional performance
and I will take every reasonable opportunity to enhance and improve my level of
knowledge and competence.] I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives and
ideals, dedicating myself before God to my chosen profession…law enforcement.
Id. at 236-37.
176

Michael Davis, Do Cops Really Need a Code of Ethics, 10, 2 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 20
(1991).
177

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 240. See also Davis, supra note 171, at 20.

178

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 240.

179

Davis, supra note 176, at 25.
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For example, police may need to work fewer and less irregular hours and become
involved in less undercover work than they are currently. Nevertheless, the use of
certain investigative methods by law enforcement officials do not conform to a code
of ethics, are not fit to be engaged in by a normal person, and can be corrected
through the use of the outrageous government conduct defense.
B. Use of Deception in Undercover Investigative Techniques
The Constitution and codes of ethics are imperfect. They do not “forbid every
political evil under the sun.”180 However, in the struggle between law enforcers and
the criminal world the use of guile and clever tactics is within reason.181 Even the
use of some deception is acceptable to combat those criminals using the same type of
trickery when committing offenses.182 Included in this practice of deception is the
use of undercover agents and government informants. The use of these two types of
investigators is not per se unlawful,183 but there is certainly a limit to allowing
governmental involvement in criminal acts. Undercover agents should not be
allowed to do by secrecy what they are not permitted by the Constitution to do
openly.184 Hence, law enforcement officials cannot violate a person’s due process
and privacy rights because the Constitution forbids this type of violation.
Prior to 1977, undercover techniques were used infrequently and only in certain
circumstances.185 Today the range of criminal activities under investigation by this
technique is broad, and the costs for such techniques have become astronomical.186
Nevertheless, the “allure and power” of undercover tactics makes them irresistible.187
To some people the use of questionable or deceptively bad undercover means is
justified because the means serve just ends.188 After all, undercover agents are
detecting crimes, and in today’s world crime seems to be overtaking our society.
The strong social and political mandate for combating criminal activity provides a
strong disincentive for a judge to hold that a defendant, who has been proven guilty,
be set free because of a police tactic used to obtain the conviction.189 But what if the
bad means do not obtain good ends? What if civil liberties are compromised because
of deceptive law enforcement techniques?
180
Dripps, supra note 162, at 264. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1981).
181

Greaney, supra note 17, at 771.

182

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 133. See also Schoeman, supra note 126, at 147.

183

Greaney, supra note 17, at 789.

184

Schoeman, supra note 126, at 147.

185

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
REPORT ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 1 (Comm. Print 1984).
186

Id. For example, in 1977 the budget was $1 million, and by 1984 the budget had grown
to a total of over $12 million. Id.
187

Marx, supra note 132, at 92.

188

Id.

189

Greaney, supra note17, at 746.
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Investigative methods that amount to deprivations of life, liberty, property and
privacy violate the Constitution unless accompanied by due process and sufficient
justification.190 The investigative method of establishing a phony sexual or
emotionally intimate relationship with the defendant violates fundamental due
process and privacy rights. In distinguishing between which tactics are justifiable it
is the “… human significance of the activity that demarcates the permissible from the
impermissible.”191 Central to any standard of public morality is the acceptance of
limitations on what can and cannot be done; this statement is true even when the
intention and expectation of a greater good or the prevention of an evil is evident.192
No matter what the greater good may be, “sex is much too strong and effective an
inducement to be used as bait” to catch even predisposed defendants.193 An offense
is no less criminal when it is committed in response to temptation than if it is
committed without any sort of temptation. Instead, the questions raised are whether
the technique was fair and what assumptions the tactic was based on when used.194
The use of sex as an investigative tool leads to a violation of the right to privacy
and exploits intimate relations and trust. This lack of trust leads to suspicions in
everyday dealings with other people.195 The use of too much deception and disguise
in such private areas cause even innocent people to fail to rely on their surroundings.
It changes how these innocent people think and act. The trust betrayed in these types
of phony sexual relationships “falls too harshly on mankind’s capacity for forming
important relationships.”196 The public cannot tolerate the exploitation of such
relations without at the same time devaluing their own respect for their connections
with others.197 The undercover use of sex denies the individual the “… right to be
left alone―the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
man.”198 The only possible result is a decline in social order that is brought about by
the exploitation of “… the cognitive and behavioral aspects of intimate relations by
using them for purposes beyond the relationship itself.”199 Intimate relations involve

190
Dripps, supra note 162, at 278. “In the context of police practices, that means
supported by a reasonable connection with the effort to prevent criminal activity or punish it
through the regular course of adjudication.” Id. at 278-79.
191

Schoeman, supra note 126, at 157.

192

Id.

193

State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *4 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug.
28, 1986).
194

Marx, supra note 132, at 73.

195

KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 137. “To say that only those tempted to do wrong would
have anything to fear underestimates the possibilities for, and evidence of, mistake and abuse
in this area.” Id.
196

Schoeman, supra note 126, at 160.

197

Id.

198

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

199
Gary T. Marx, Under-the-Covers Undercover Investigations: Some Reflections on the
State’s Use of Sex and Deception in Law Enforcement, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 13 (1992).
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trust that eventually leads to the exchange of confidences.200 As a result, “[a]nything
that debases that trust must be viewed as undesirable.”201
Law enforcement officers enjoy wide latitude and flexibility in their use of
techniques. There simply exists no real check on the discretion held by law
enforcement agents and their informants,202 and the use of manipulation and deceit to
investigate is largely unfettered by judicial control.203 The due process/outrageous
government conduct defense does create outer limits on appropriate law enforcement
techniques if it is used correctly.204 The defense should not be cast aside merely
because it presents some analytical problems.205 Sexual misconduct by law
enforcement officials and their agents falls outside any sort of law enforcement
justification.206 In determining the point at which government agents lose the law
enforcement justification, the point at which the due process defense should be used
is simultaneously discovered.207 The “moral shabbiness” of this form of police
deception is so threatening to a social self-image that we should be willing to endure
a higher level of the criminal activity in question.208
Zeal in tracking down crime is not always wrong; but experience has taught us
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of over-zealous law
enforcement.209 Government should not be allowed to increase the risks associated
with ordinary social relationships.210 The government is unable to search or invade a
person’s private home without a judicial warrant. Why should the government be
allowed to invade a person’s body without that person being fully informed of the

200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Todd, supra note 66, at 442. See also Gershman, supra note 131, at 169.

203

Gershman, supra note 131, at 169. See also Todd, supra note 66, at 442.

204

Greaney, supra note 17, at 781. See also Marcus, supra note 20, at 465. Marcus argues
that there will be fact situations where reasonable people could agree that the law enforcement
behavior was utterly outrageous. Id.
205

Greaney, supra note 17, at 781.

206

Id. at 782. The law enforcement justification is a subset of the larger defense of
justification. The Model Penal Code states:
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or
defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Official Draft 1962).
207

Greaney, supra note 17, at 782.

208

KLEINING, supra note 152, at 137.

209

Gershman, supra note 131, at 184.

210

Id.
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circumstances? Is the use of sex even so different than the use of unwarranted
physical or mental coercion?211 The argument can be made that sex is a type of
physical or mental coercion. When law enforcement agencies and their confidential
informants utilize sex as an investigative tool, “… there is no way for the courts or
anyone else to determine whether such inducement served only to uncover an
existing propensity or created a new one.”212 Regardless of the defendant’s
predisposition to commit the offense, the use of sex falls extremely short of an
acceptable standard of police conduct, and it is repugnant to use such tactics to lure
any person into crime. Nevertheless, federal and state courts have almost always
failed to declare this type of conduct outrageous.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF CASES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
Limited law exists on the government’s use of sex in criminal investigations.
Because no definite standard is available as to what constitutes outrageous
government conduct, courts have been reluctant to dismiss indictments based on a
few isolated episodes of sexual activity by the undercover agent or informant during
the investigative process. According to a review of the limited existing law, it is
somewhat clear that defendants who succumbed to the government’s sexual
inducements were allowed to present entrapment defenses and obtain an entrapment
jury charge.213 However, because many of these defendants have also been
predisposed to commit the crimes, the entrapment defense is almost always
unsuccessful. The proper defense in these types of situations should be the
outrageous government conduct defense because predisposition of the defendant is
not required. The use of sex by a government agent/informant definitely “shocks the
conscience,”214 and deprives the defendant of fundamental due process and privacy
rights which is the basis for the outrageous conduct defense.215
A. Federal Cases
The use of government informants has become a popular tactic in combating
crime today. The government seeks out an informant, usually someone the
defendant knows or someone who will receive less prison time or immunity for
helping the government,216 and then gives the informant instructions on what he or
she is to accomplish. The acts of the informant, just as the acts of undercover agents,
should be attributed to the government through normal agency principles. The
211

See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, United
States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
212
State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *4 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug.
28, 1986).
213

Tarlow, supra note 3, at 38. See also United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1978) (though unsuccessful, defendant presented entrapment defense to jury where informer
emotionally and sexually seduced him).
214

Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.

215

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, & XIV.

216

Mark H. Moore, Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law
Enforcement, in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 17,
27 (1983).
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government should be responsible for the actions of its agents, whether they are
actual agents or informants. However, one court has opined that they would be less
sympathetic to the prosecution where an actual law enforcement agent engages in
sex or sex-related conduct with a defendant, as opposed to an informer.217 In this
case, United States v. Simpson, the FBI employed the services of an informant whom
they knew was a prostitute, heroin user and a fugitive from Canadian authorities.218
The defendant argued that his due process rights and constitutional right to privacy
were violated because the FBI knew she was a prostitute, directed her to become
close to him and continued to use her as an informant after they learned that the two
were having sexual relations.219 The Ninth Circuit relied on a number of factors in
determining that the government’s conduct did not violate the defendant’s due
process rights.220
The Ninth Circuit used the factor derived from the United States v. Bogart
decision221 stating that outrageous government conduct only bars prosecution in
cases where the law enforcement officials have been “brutal” or used “physical or
psychological coercion” on the defendant.222 Relying on the decision in Rochin v.
California to determine what kind of conduct was outrageous enough to qualify,223
the Ninth Circuit decided that the use of an informant who became sexually intimate
with the defendant was not analogous to the pumping of a defendant’s stomach to
find illegal drugs.224 The court limited the outrageous conduct defense to physical or
psychological abuse. However, it can be argued that a phony sexual relationship is a
type of physical or psychological abuse.225 The court also stated that an informant
must enjoy a great deal of latitude in making and deciding how to establish rapport
with the suspect, and that it would be impossible to identify a fixed point at which a
causal relationship turned into something more “‘shocking.’”226 Courts worry about
drawing upon their personal notions of “human sexuality and social mores;”227
however, they have previously used personal notions of morality in their decisions,
and this type of case would prove no different. Informants do enjoy an enormous
amount of flexibility during undercover operations; however, when an informant
engages in sexual relations, the line has been crossed and the conduct should be
declared outrageous.

217

United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1468 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987).

218

Id. at 1464.

219

Id. at 1465.

220

Id. at 1465-69.

221

783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).

222

Id. at 1435.

223

342 U.S. 165 (1952).

224

Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1465-66.

225

See supra notes 117-57 and accompanying text.

226

Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466.

227

Id.
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The Simpson court additionally decided that the FBI was not responsible for the
informant’s sexual conduct with the defendant. The court found “the government’s
passive tolerance here of a private informant’s questionable conduct to be less
egregious than the conscious direction of government agents typically present in
outrageous conduct challenges.”228 At some point, though, the FBI had to become
aware of the informant’s sexual involvement with the defendant. The government
just chose to look the other way and not compromise the investigation in progress.
The decisions of the FBI and this court are reprehensible and morally offensive. As
noted above, according to agency principles the acts of the informant should be
imputed to the FBI leading to the conclusion that the FBI is responsible for the acts
of its informants. Nonetheless, the court failed to classify the conduct as outrageous
and also noted that it need not decide whether the use of sex by an actual agent
would shock the conscience.229 However, other circuits would be given the
opportunity to address that question.
The Second Circuit was given a chance to decide whether the use of sex by an
undercover agent constituted outrageous conduct.230 In United States v. Cuervelo,
the defendant was a subject of a government operation designed to ferret out a drug
conspiracy.231 An undercover agent conducting the investigation testified that he
tried to establish a “‘love interest’” with the defendant, and according to the
defendant they had sexual relations on at least fifteen occasions.232 Additionally, the
agent allegedly gave the defendant gifts of money, clothes, jewelry and numerous
love letters to convince her to take part in a major drug sale.233 Based on its review
of Simpson, the court developed three criteria that the defendant must show in order
to make out a successful outrageous conduct claim:
1) that the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its
investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own
purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed;
2) that the government agent initiated a sexual relationship, or allowed it
to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends; and
3) that the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period
covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged
therein.234

228

Id. at 1468.

229

Id. at 1468 n.4.

230

United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991).

231

Id. at 561.

232

Id. at 561-63.

233

Id. at 563.

234

Id. at 567. See also United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
“[T]here is little doubt that Cuervelo envisioned these criteria as the standard to be applied on
the merits since the court noted that, at the merits stage, the district court would have to
consider the following questions (which essentially address the same issues).”
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Ultimately, the court remanded the case back to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing because certain facts had not been adequately discovered.235
The establishment of these factors was at least an attempt by a federal court to
determine some type of concrete standard by which to judge sexual misconduct by a
government agent/informant. The problem with these factors is that they allow some
leeway for government agents/informants to use sex and not be punished. What if
the sexual relations occurred before the investigation took place or towards the end
of the investigation? What if the government always insisted that it did not know
about the relationship that was taking place at the time of the investigation? With
questions like these, the government and the courts are sure to avoid having to find
sexual misconduct by agents/informants outrageous enough to warrant use of the due
process defense. Therefore, these types of sexual investigative techniques must be
outlawed totally in order to avoid the government using excuses for this type of
behavior.
In United States v. Nolan-Cooper,236 the court used the factors in Cuervelo and
decided that outrageous government conduct was not present in this case. In NolanCooper, the defendant became a target of the IRS when the government obtained
information that she was involved in the laundering of illegal drug proceeds.237 The
government set up an investigation using an undercover agent who posed as a drug
dealer, and the defendant readily accepted the chance to launder money for the
agent.238 However, during the course of the thirteen-month investigation, the
relationship between the agent and the defendant became socially close, and on one
occasion, sexual.239 The agent gave the defendant gifts, “wined and dined” her and
invited her to his plush hotels; additionally, another agent accompanied him one
night and had sex with one of the defendant’s friends.240 Cuervelo241 was used as the
focus of the court’s opinion.

(a) To what extent is the undercover agent’s conduct attributable to the
government (i.e. did the government actively or passively acknowledge or
encourage the sexual relationship)?
(b) What purpose(s) did the agent’s sexual conduct serve, if any?
(c) Did the agent act on his own initiative or under the direction (or with the
approval) of his agency?
(d) Who initiated the relationship?
(e) When did the alleged sexual relations end?
Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 232-33 (quoting Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 568).
235
Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 569. “On remand, the district court should make findings of fact
regarding the conduct alleged by [defendant] and based upon what those findings are, if
indicated, should proceed to determine whether the government engaged in conduct that was
sufficiently outrageous to constitute a violation of [defendant’s] constitutional rights.” Id.
236

155 F.3d 221 (3rd Cir. 1998).

237

Id. at 224.

238

Id.

239

Id.

240

Id. at 226-27.

241

949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991).
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The court examined the factors developed in Cuervelo,242 and adopted that
standard with one modification as the law of the Third Circuit. The court recognized
that the guidelines in Cuervelo required that the defendant introduce evidence
demonstrating that the government knew its undercover agent had engaged or was
engaging in sexual conduct with him/her.243 The court decided that this standard was
too strict and would encourage the government to “turn a blind eye” to the actions of
their agents.244 Hence, the court changed the standard to only requiring that the
defendant show “the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its
investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes once it
knew or should have known that such a relationship existed.”245 Using this
formulation, in addition with the other two factors in Cuervelo, the court concluded
there was no evidence of any “‘nexus or connection’” between the sexual conduct
and the investigation,246 and that this “… one instance of sexual misconduct alone
does not give rise to a due process violation within the extremely narrow confines of
the outrageous government conduct doctrine.”247 The fact that the sexual misconduct
occurred within a month before the investigation was completed, and after the agent
had gathered the necessary evidence, was also important to the court.248
The fact that the agent did not set out to use sex as a weapon, or that the sexual
misconduct only occurred once, should not make a difference in the analysis. The
agent still engaged in sexual misconduct during the investigation, and used romance
and seduction throughout the investigation that led up to the gathering of information
and the sexual encounter. Although the court believed that these facts (that the agent
did not set out to use sex as a weapon and the sexual misconduct occurred only once)
made a difference, the judge did take into account other facts during the sentencing
of the defendant. The judge decided to depart downward from the federal sentencing
guidelines due to the circumstances. The judge thought that the defendant performed
a public service for the government by “… ‘ferreting’ out sexual misconduct in one
of its agents.”249 Notwithstanding the departure in sentencing, the defendant was still
physically and emotionally affected by the misconduct of the agent. Although the
sex acts did not seem to be directly related to the criminality of the defendant, “they
were part of the façade created by the government agent and as such the agent was
acting as the government.”250
242

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.

243

Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 233.

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Id. at 234.

247

Id.

248

Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 234-35.

249

Shannon P. Duffy, For Lawyer Seduced By Government Agent, Sentence Reduced By
Federal Judge, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 17, 1999, at 1.
250
Id. The façade included dinners, nightclubbing, expensive hotels and other socializing.
The agent spent more than $50,000.00 in connection with this investigation. Shannon P.
Duffy, Due Process Was Not Violated When Investigator Had Sex With Target, But
Resentencing Ordered, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 3, 1998, at 1.
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The single incident of sex should be viewed as a total picture of using romance to
further the investigation. There was a “bodily intrusion” of the government into this
defendant’s body, and as such, “the defendant did not agree to have sex with the
United States government.”251 As was noted above, sex and intimacy require privacy
and cause one to become vulnerable.252 Human beings need to be informed about the
people with whom they become intimate; they need to know relevant characteristics
about the person and the situation.253 To destroy these private realms of intimacy and
love is the moral equivalent to torture with the capacity to destroy all aspects of
honesty and good.254 It is in this regard that the use of sex and seduction in
undercover investigations “… is the moral equivalent of rape because they both deny
the dignity and freedom of the individual.”255
Other federal courts have dealt similarly with sexual misconduct by a
government agent or informant by finding that the sexual conduct which occurred
was neither outrageous nor violative of due process or privacy rights.256 The only
court that has actually reversed a conviction due to sexual misconduct by a
government agent is the United States Court of Military Appeals.257 In that case,
agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation targeted the defendant who
had just become a member of the Air Force.258 The defendant was emotionally
unstable, an alcoholic and her husband and children had just recently left her.259 The
agents used an informant who was a Staff Sergeant at the base where the defendant
was located, and this informant engaged in adulterous and sodomous behavior with
251

Duffy, supra note 249, at 1.

252

See supra text accompanying notes 117-57.

253

See supra text accompanying notes 132-37.

254

See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.

255

Marx, supra note 199, at 14.

256

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1267-69 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
outrageous government conduct defense even though government employed cocaine addict
and previous sexual partner of defendant as informant); United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d
705, 707 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting outrageous government conduct defense when the
government employed one of the defendant’s previous sexual partners); United States v.
Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1427-34 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting outrageous government conduct
defense, but remanding the case for an issue of entrapment, when the government employed a
long time friend of the defendant as an informant who engaged in sexual conduct with the
defendant throughout the investigation); United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262, 265-66 (1st Cir.
1986) (rejecting outrageous government conduct defense when the investigating officer
obtained incriminating information while carrying on an affair with the defendant’s live-in
companion); United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
outrageous government conduct defense when informant used sexual and family relationships
to obtain information and when government paid for an abortion arising from the informant’s
sexual relationship with the defendant); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir.
1978) (rejecting outrageous government conduct defense because the informant’s sexual
relationship with the defendant was not carried on at the request of the government agents).
257

United States v. Lemaster, 40 M.J. 178 (C.M.A. 1994).

258

Id. at 179.

259

Id.
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the defendant in order to entice her to possess cocaine.260 However, the decision was
not outwardly based on the outrageous government conduct defense. Instead the
court held that the targeting of the defendant in this case constituted improper
inducement of a servicemember, and at a minimum it violated the fundamental
norms of military due process and was the equivalent to entrapment.261 The court did
mention that the defendant was predisposed, and that it was unreasonable for an
agent to induce an emotionally unstable alcoholic to participate in crimes and then
arrest her because she was unable to resist his love and affection.262
Military courts do not act as precedents for other federal courts; nevertheless, it is
useful to analyze the decision to determine what the court really meant in its opinion.
Because the court admitted that the defendant was predisposed, the entrapment
defense is unavailable to her. The outrageous government conduct defense is the
only defense left, and the court does say that the conduct of the agent was
reprehensible and violative of military due process.263 Perhaps this case should act as
a guide for other federal courts in their dealings with sexual misconduct by
government agents. The use of sexual misconduct should be declared reprehensible,
morally offensive and outrageous. Sexual misconduct should not be tolerated during
undercover investigations; hence, once it has been determined that sexual
misconduct occurred, the outrageous government conduct defense should apply.
B. State Cases
The state courts seem to take “… a less forgiving approach to law enforcement
agents, including confidential informers straying into forbidden sexual territory.”264
However, most state court decisions are not directly on point. In a Florida case,265 a
confidential informant who knew the defendant previously, re-established her
connections and asked him on several occasions to get her cocaine.266 When he told
her that he had stopped using drugs, she started kissing him and telling him that they
could “fool around and party” if he would just get her some drugs.267 The informant
later admitted that the police officers told her “… to push it because they were sure
that I could take him into it.”268 The court noted that “… sex involves physical and
psychological desires so strong as to readily foster fantasies and to anesthetize or
supplant normal rational reasoning and will.”269 The court concluded that the
260

Id. at 180.

261

Id. at 181. “Esprit de corps, good order and discipline, and high morale are not, in any
way enhanced or maintained by this type of police work.” Lemaster, 40 M.J. at 181.
262

Id. at 180-81.

263

See supra note 256 and accompanying text.

264

Tarlow, supra note 3, at 39.

265

State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 28,

1986).
266

Id. at *1.

267

Id.

268

Id. at *2 n.1.

269

Id. at *3. See also supra text accompanying notes 117-57.
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defendant had been entrapped by the talk of sex, and was induced into committing a
crime that he would not otherwise commit.270 Even though the defendant used
entrapment here instead of the outrageous conduct defense, the court still based its
conclusion on the fact that sex is too strong and effective an inducement to be used
as bait. Actual sexual relations had not even occurred, and the court still found that
the defendant was induced into committing the crime.
Similarly, in People v. Martinez,271 California seemed to be focused on the
intensity of the sexual talk and insinuations. An attractive, young female undercover
agent, posing as an unemployed Las Vegas card dealer, was introduced to the
defendant.272 The agent acted the part of a “loose woman” who might trade sexual
favors for narcotics.273 Even though this conduct may seem relatively tame
compared to that discussed above, the court concluded that the conduct “... falls far
short of an acceptable standard of police conduct and constitutes entrapment.”274
Once again, the court used the entrapment defense and not the outrageous
government conduct defense. If the defendant is found not to be predisposed, then
the entrapment defense is applicable. However, if the defendant is predisposed to
committing the crime, the outrageous government conduct defense is appropriate,
and the analysis should proceed according to due process principles. One could
argue that the appropriate solution would be to eliminate the requirement of
predisposition with the entrapment defense. However, the outrageous government
conduct defense is a separate defense based on constitutional principles, and is also
needed to combat over-reaching government behavior that entrapment cannot stop.
Entrapment has been widely used and known to be applicable when the defendant
had no predisposition to commit the crime. It would be foolish to eliminate one
defense and change entrapment to encompass the outrageous government conduct
defense. Two separate defenses are needed in order to deal with misconduct by the
government. The two defenses address evils in different situations, and the
outrageous government conduct defense can be specifically tailored to combat sexual
misconduct of the government even when the entrapment defense is unavailable.
The state of Washington has found outrageous government conduct when sexual
misconduct is engaged in by a government agent/informant.275 In this case, a
government informant engaged in a sexual relationship with an alcoholic defendant

270

Banks, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *3. “Accordingly, where sex is involved as the
inducement … the case does not depend on the subtlety of the sexual suggestion, who initiated
it, … or the strength of the logical inductive reasoning process that causes a defendant to
believe there is an implication of future sexual favors …” Id.
271

203 Cal. Rptr. 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).

272

Id. at 839.

273

Id.

274
Id. See also People v. Hillary, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415, 419-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(where undercover agent offered highly alluring sexual pleasures in exchange for narcotics,
the court found sufficient evidence for entrapment). “Police inducements which play on
‘base’ emotions are no less reprehensible than those which appeal to more altruistic feelings.”
Id. at 419.
275

Washington v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1996).
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and even proposed marriage in an effort to persuade the defendant to sell cocaine.276
Even though the informant denied having any sexual relations with the defendant,
the court found that “… the emotional reliance of the [d]efendant on the informant
was an integral part of the informant’s control,”277 and this type of conduct was
sufficient for a defense of outrageous government conduct.278 This case recognizes
the intensity of emotions that accompany sexual conduct and romantic intimacy.
Sexual conduct becomes an unfair investigative technique and surpasses the limits of
any type of decency.
Ohio’s view of governmental sexual misconduct seems to be parallel to that of
the federal cases discussed above. In an unpublished decision, an Ohio appellate
court did not find the use of sex by a government informant to be outrageous
conduct.279 In this case, the informant eventually persuaded the defendant to sell
drugs by saying that she needed the money for her children.280 Additionally, she
engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant, “…thereby greatly endearing
herself to him and making his refusal to sell her drugs extremely difficult, if not
impossible.”281 Nonetheless, the court commented that even though it may look with
disdain on the informant’s use of sexuality to influence the defendant, the sexual
activity with the defendant had ceased well before the sale of the drugs.282 As was
noted above, just because the sexual activity was not occurring at the exact time of
the offense does not mean that it did not influence and persuade the defendant to
commit the crime. Some actions are taken in response to what others have said or
done; sex is no different. In fact, it is even more powerful than other types of
persuasion or inducements.283 The use of sex influences people to act a certain way.
Additionally, when people are intimately involved, they do not want to disappoint
their partners and will usually succumb to what they are asked to accomplish. For
that reason, when the government engages in sexual misconduct with a person who
is under investigation, it may be extremely difficult for that person to resist the
temptations and say no to the request. On the other hand, even when sex is a part of
the crime to be investigated, deception is still involved when the agent/informant
takes it upon himself/herself to become too engrossed in the investigation.
Arguments have been made concluding that the use of sex in the enforcement of
laws requiring sexual conduct (specifically prostitution) can be justified.284 Most
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state courts have taken this approach.285 Although prostitution usually involves only
sexual intimacy and not emotional closeness, there is a difference when deception is
used.286 In this sense sexual acts are “personal” even in the absence of psychological
intimacy, and betrayal of another’s body is extremely violative.287 Additionally,
prostitution is a relatively minor misdemeanor charge, and to spend so much time
and money on the investigation does not seem right. Courts have found that at times,
unorthodox investigatory methods are necessary to obtain certain types of criminals.
This statement may be true; yet, it is not right to specifically instruct an agent or
informant to engage in sexual activity if necessary to obtain evidence.288 If the
undercover agent must solicit a prostitute in order to obtain evidence or make an
arrest, the arrest should be made before any type of sexual activity occurs. If the
prostitute agrees to perform services, this agreement is enough to make an arrest.
The conduct does not need to proceed any further. If the conduct does proceed
further than the agreement to engage in sexual relations, then the agent/informant has
crossed the line and the conduct should be declared outrageous.
VI. A SOLUTION
Since the courts have not specifically defined what constitutes outrageous
government conduct that “shocks the conscience,”289 and because all cases must be
decided on their own facts to determine whether a defendant’s due process rights
have been violated, a standard of uniformity will never be reached. In addition,
cases involving sexual misconduct by government agents/informants have even less
of a chance of reaching uniformity based on the current federal and state case law.290
Without any solid standard on which to base instances of governmental sexual
misconduct, the limits of decency and morality are surpassed without a chance of
return. Courts have found that one sexual episode is not enough to constitute

285
See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 462 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting outrageous
government conduct when undercover agents engaged in acts of prostitution to catch the
defendant with drugs); Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting
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outrageous behavior,291 and that sexual relations that occurred too long before or
after the important information was gathered do not violate due process or privacy
rights.292 Courts have also reasoned that when the government is found not to have
known about the sexual conduct, outrageous conduct does not exist.293
Taking into account how sex is perceived in today’s world, along with agency
principles, this reasoning is flawed. Furthermore, if one sexual misconduct episode
is allowed, then further along down the road two, three or even more episodes will be
allowed. The government will continue to argue that it knew nothing about the
sexual encounters, that it in no way encouraged them to occur, and that the sexual
relations had nothing to do with the investigation. This common slippery slope
argument fits perfectly into this problem. Who is going to draw the line between
permissible government sexual misconduct and impermissible conduct? The courts
cannot even agree on what outrageous government conduct actually looks like. The
only way to solve this problem is to develop a uniform rule that the courts must
adopt when determining whether the government’s use of sexual conduct was
outrageous and violative of due process and privacy rights.
Because no possible way exists to draw a line between permissible and
impermissible sexual misconduct by the government, the only solution is to forbid all
types of sexual activity by the government throughout the entire investigation. This
solution does not mean that the use of deception or other clever tactics may not be
used. What it means is that if and when romantic intimacy or sexual conduct occurs,
the outrageous government conduct defense is satisfied. The Constitution leaves it to
the political branches of government to decide whether to regulate law enforcement
conduct which may “… offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically.”294 The federal and state
legislatures should pass laws forbidding any type of sexual or intense romantic
conduct to be used by the government in undercover investigations. The law should
be written into all law enforcement codes of ethics and behavior guides so that the
agents are aware of what type of conduct they cannot use in investigating crimes.
All government informants must be made aware of the law and the penalties for
disobeying it. If a government agent/informant engages in this type of newly
forbidden behavior, the indictment against the defendant must be dismissed or if the
defendant has already been convicted, the conviction must be reversed.
Additionally, the government may choose to have the agent suspended or even
terminated, and the guilty informant may never be used again in a law enforcement
investigation.
291
See, e.g., United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3rd Cir. 1998) (finding that
only one incident of sexual intercourse did not constitute outrageous conduct).
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See, e.g., Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (finding that the only incident of sexual
intercourse occurred within a month before the investigation was completed); United States v.
Miller, 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that sexual relations occurred too soon before
the actual investigation had begun).
293

See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the use
of sex in the investigation was not attributable to the government); United States v. Prairie,
572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that the sexual conduct was not carried out as a request
from the government).
294

Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000

33

826

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:833

Because people need to assume a level of good faith and trust in intimate
relations, and because privacy is an essential constitutional right,295 this type of law is
the only one that makes sense. Even if the defendant was predisposed to committing
the crime, it is not fair to allow law enforcement officials to use any type of means
necessary to catch the defendant. The use of sex and intimate romance is a technique
that is so distasteful,296 its use should be prohibited. Police activity must be regulated
by something more than the law―it must respect the values of a community, and by
forbidding this type of “intimate surveillance” this goal is accomplished.297
Government cannot afford to ignore what is important to human beings (trusting and
intimate relationships). Abandonment of respect for such relationships “… will
seriously diminish the worth of the social order to people.”298 Moreover, privacy has
become an important constitutional right that has continuously been litigated, and the
current trend leans toward ruling in favor of the individual’s privacy. If the courts
continue to recognize sex and intimacy as an appropriate investigative tool, then this
recognition may actually serve as an incentive for sexual misconduct in the United
States. In order to promote morality and decency in the world, sexual misconduct by
government agents/informants must be forbidden. No other alternatives are
available.
VII. CONCLUSION
Government agents and informants must not be permitted to use any type of
investigative tool necessary to gather important information from a defendant or to
obtain a conviction. By allowing law enforcement officials to engage in immoral
and unethical conduct, society is given the impression that sex can be used and
relationships exploited as long as the courts do not disagree. The time has come to
change this impression. Courts have noted previously that by attempting to draw
some kind of line as to what constitutes permissible or impermissible sexual
behavior would require them to draw on their personal and private notions of human
sexuality and social mores.299 However, courts have previously used their personal
notions of sexuality and morality time and again.300 Moreover, the legislature would
draw the line and pass the law regaining the abolition of all sexual conduct used by
the government in undercover investigations. The courts would merely apply the
law to each set of facts that came before it.
In a world that is so sexually advanced, we must not lose sight of our morals and
all elements of governmental decency. An outrageous government conduct defense
should be successful whenever sexual or intense intimate relations occur between an
undercover agent/informant and a defendant. This type of conduct violates a
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person’s fundamental due process and privacy rights and should not be tolerated.
The only solution is to forbid this type of conduct regardless of the circumstances or
the severity of the crime. Some people argue that a need exists for flexibility and
variety in law enforcement situations and that “categorical prohibition” is
inappropriate.301 These people continue to opine that each case must be examined
separately on the basis of its own facts.302 However, this solution is not morally or
constitutionally acceptable. Undercover agents/informants can be successful in
using other types of deception in their investigations that are morally acceptable
without engaging in sexual or romantic relationships. If the government cannot
catch a “criminal” with permissible and constitutionally proper methods, then that
“criminal” should not be caught. Sex is much too strong and effective an
inducement to be used as bait.303 If this kind of conduct is permitted to persist, the
constitutional rights of citizens will continue to be jeopardized.
ANDREA B. DALOIA
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